|
|||||||||||||
GEN JONES: Good morning, everyone…. Thank you for coming here and going to the trouble of coming out to SHAPE. I appreciate it. For me it’s an opportunity to thank you for everything you’ve done during my almost four years here, and to unfortunately bid you farewell; but also to tell you most sincerely how much I appreciate what you do for the publics, for the Alliance, for everything that we’re trying to get done in this very difficult and very complicated and troubled world, in this still new century that announces itself as being so complex and difficult, but yet so very important to our freedom and our security.
I believe honestly that the role the media play is extraordinarily important. I want to thank those of you who have taken the time to come on the various trips that we’ve had, those of you who are regular attendees out here at the periodic breakfasts that we’ve had, and to just say that I’m deeply in debt to you for your work in trying to explain to our publics – in my words, not yours – what NATO is trying to do, why NATO is still a relevant organisation, and how it’s trying to change to meet the new realities and the new complexities of the 21st century. We talk about it in terms of transformation and I think that’s a good word. I’ve said many, many times that transformation has many facets to it. It’s not just about changes in the military; it’s about changes in the Alliance as it reorients not only its capabilities but its strategic thinking in terms of how it’s going to shape itself to face the asymmetric world that we live in. The 20th century faced a very symmetric world. That symmetric world spawned the birth of the Alliance, and now the Alliance is in the process of reconfiguring itself in terms of capabilities, but also in terms of mental outlook – culture, if you will – to be relevant and to make a contribution to our collective security, which I think is the new bumper sticker, if you will, as opposed to common defence which was the old one.
I think in these past four years, if you take a step back – particularly since the Prague Summit which I’m so fond of referring to, because I do think that was the launching point for what NATO is becoming; it certainly was the summit that gave us the vision that we’re currently executing and gave us the imprimatur, if you will, for the reforms and the changes that have thus far taken place – I think we’ve made some good headway. There’s still obviously much more to be done, but I think NATO is in the process of explaining itself to the publics. I think more needs to be done on that score. To be perfectly honest, I think our ability to communicate our strategic intent still is in its developmental stage, but the message is increasingly clear, the direction is increasingly obvious, and the need for an organisation like NATO is ever more apparent.
The Alliance, I believe, is healthy. It is certainly an Alliance that has expanded by seven nations in the last four years. It’s liable to expand even further in the years ahead, although we know that the Riga Summit is not an expansion summit. But we hear tell that it’s certainly one that’s going to announce itself as being open to future expansion, whenever that happens and whenever suitable candidates meet the requirements as defined by the Alliance.
There is no question, from the operational side, that we’re busy, with over 50,000 NATO soldiers on three different continents. The Kosovo force is still viable, ready, and capable of doing what needs to be done. We await the results of the talks on the final status for Kosovo. But hopefully the peaceful conditions that exist there now will continue and Kosovo will be on a good path.
Operation Active Endeavour you’ve heard me talk about many times. It is a very important operation. It is the catalyst that is beginning to link Mediterranean Dialogue nations (you know who they are, but just to recite them: Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan and Israel) to NATO in terms of security and stability in the Mediterranean region. It’s a very positive, very important operation – NATO’s only Article 5 mission, which means its only real declared mission with a counter-terrorism mandate. I think operation Active Endeavour can be the springboard for many more naval agreements and naval security missions reaching into other waterways in the world, notably the Bosphorous, the Adriatic, maybe even ultimately up into the Black Sea, as people rightly are very concerned with the flow of commerce across the waterways of the world and the abilities of the navies to make them safe and secure. It’s certainly a mission that potentially could be an expanded one. The mission in Iraq continues apace, making good contributions and providing equipment and training for young Iraqi officers at our training base in Ar Rustimayah, and also many nations have invited Iraqis to come to their countries to take advantage of the schools. So that three-prong mission is going along quite well. Darfur is still pretty much the way it was in terms of capacity building for the Italians that go in and out of Sudan and tactical lift for the battalions in and out of Sudan as well.
Before I get to ISAF, let me say a word about the NRF. As we speak, the nations are meeting to discuss offers for the future rotations of the NATO Response Force, specifically NRF-8, 9 and 10. NRF-8 comes into activity after the first of the year. And this force generation conference is the first one that we’ve had – it started yesterday and it will end tomorrow – to look into the out years at some length, so that nations can plan further out in terms of the troop contributions they want to make to future NRF rotations. We hope that the remainder of what’s needed to round out the future rotations will be provided within the next few days, and early returns suggest some promise in that regard, which is encouraging.
ISAF, which I saved for last – NATO’s self-declared most important mission, and the one that you hear most about. As you know, yesterday NATO started a humanitarian mission in the northwest corner of the country where thousands of people have been hit by flash floods, and we are conducting a humanitarian relief operation as we speak. This is an important operation. It’s estimated that there are at least 50 dead and hundreds missing, so it’s a real humanitarian tragedy. We’re coordinating the delivery of tons of humanitarian aid – water, food, blankets, medical supplies. The weather still hampers the mission a little bit because it’s so severe. The roads are virtually impassable. Convoys can only move at less than a kilometre an hour sometimes because of the conditions. I particularly want to thank Germany, Norway, Italy and Spain for their efforts in that part of the country, plus the air support provided from Germany, Italy, Spain and Belgium. Even though flying conditions are difficult and we can’t fly as much as we like, we are staging equipment that’s being provided from the host government and also from UNAMA. And ISAF is turning to with the PRTs and the forces in the western part of the country to try to get that aid where it’s most needed. I just received a call this morning from General Back to say that in Uruzgan province they’ve also had deteriorating humanitarian conditions due to adverse weather and flooding, with perhaps as many as 30 people dead, homes damaged and the like. So we’re watching that one as well and we will do what we can to bring some relief to those people that are struggling. As the weather changes and the cold weather sets in, this is a real tragedy and we’re going to do what we can to be helpful.
On Friday last week I received a visit from General Ehsan ul Haq, the Chairman of the Pakistani Joint Chiefs, who paid a historic visit to NATO, starting at SHAPE. We had a series of briefings for General ul Haq to introduce Allied Command Operations and SHAPE to him. We were able to talk about the situation along the border and the implementation of the accords on the Pakistani side and, at least from our perspective, what the early returns are. I was very impressed at the Pakistani military’s willingness to engage with ISAF and NATO. We have opened up a series of future bilateral meetings between General Craddock, my relief, and him and I think that’s going to go very well. And also at the tactical level we are setting up good strong links with the Pakistani forces on the other side of the border to report and observe what’s going on so that we can try to shut down the border activity between Pakistan and Afghanistan from the standpoint of illegal traffic and the flow of fighters going to and from the two countries. So that’s a very positive development. This is my third meeting with him – two times in Islamabad and once here – and I think it’s a good omen and a good sign that the militaries are working very well together.
A few comments about Afghanistan in general. I think it’s important that when we talk about Afghanistan we talk about the nation as a whole. I’m a big fan of embedded reporters, but what happens generally with embedded reporters sometimes is that the reports that you get are only from the region where they happen to be. I think we need to take a step back and consider all of Afghanistan and make our assessment not based on the latest IED that’s gone off, but just generally how the country is doing and what we are trying to do there. Thirty-seven nations are working together to try to bring about the reforms and the vision for a free, independent and stable Afghanistan. This is not going to be done overnight. It is not just a military problem, although the military in certain parts of the country is more important than it is in others. But it is a challenge of cohesion between the relief efforts, the reconstruction and development efforts, the efforts of the Karzai government, and obviously the coordination of the security forces both from NATO, the remnants of OEF and also from the emerging Afghan National Police, Afghan National Security Forces. We’re not going to be successful overnight, but I think that in the main Afghanistan is moving in the right direction and I believe that with more focus, particularly at the international level, to do the four or five things that absolutely have to have top priority, then we can have earlier success in Afghanistan than perhaps many people think. As you’ve heard me say before, those things focus on the narcotics problem, judicial reform, more focus on developing the quantity and the quality of local police that are required, and a renewed leadership by the Karzai government to attack the things that are slowing the progress of the reforms in the country, such as corruption, rule of law, and things that the Afghan people have voted for overwhelmingly not too long ago, in electing a president and electing a parliament that reflects their wishes. Those instruments are still developing and working hard to try to expand their influence. As you know, there are millions of children going to school now. Roads are being built. There’s a lot of reconstruction and development that people don’t read about, and should read about. That’s the true story of the direction of Afghanistan.
We have to pay attention, obviously, to the level of violence. But I insist, as I depart the scene, that the Taliban is not ten feet tall. The Taliban is a factor in certain areas, not in others. We have to be concerned about crime; we have to be concerned about the narco-trafficking which increasingly is a bigger problem. We have to say clearly that we have to reverse the trend that currently exists in Afghanistan, because the influence of narcotics is all-encompassing on that society. It affects the emergence of a stable economy; it affects the corruption of senior officials; it’s the economic engine for whatever resurgence there is of the violence. It pays for ammunition; it pays for IED development; it pays salaries of fighters. So it is a serious difficulty that I’m sure nations will focus on. We have to bring this in line with all of the other things. But it’s a cumulative effect of all the parts working together – the military, the civilian organisations, all focusing on bringing about the effects that are required.
Let me stop with that and try to respond to any questions that you might have. Thank you for your attention.
Q: Can I ask you what would be the one thing you would expect out of the Riga Summit? What would you want out of the Riga Summit in terms of moving the Afghanistan issue forward….? And on Pakistan … are you saying that you are now satisfied with the extent of cooperation you’re getting from Pakistani authorities on the border?
GEN JONES: With regard to Riga, the Secretary General is intent on getting a reaffirmation on the part of heads of state that Afghanistan is in fact the Alliance’s number one priority. It’s the place where NATO has decided to make a very positive contribution and has taken a stand. I think it’s important that the Summit also reaffirm the concern of nations into the reconstruction part of the mission as well as the military part. We are working in the force generation business today, as we speak, to solicit other contributions from nations to round out the requirements of the CJSOR which as you know is about 85 percent filled. We’re very clear on what’s needed. That hasn’t changed, and we’re working hard to round out that capability. Also included in that is, in fact, more focused discussion on national restrictions and the impact of those restrictions on our ability to manoeuvre the forces and to do the things that we need to do. Removing caveats is tantamount to raising more forces. You have more capability. We’ve had many discussions over the past few weeks, most recently with the Chiefs of Defence last week in Brussels. Those of you who have been around Europe for a while will know that in 2003 we went through the same thing in Kosovo, and we were able ultimately to get nations to virtually withdraw all of their caveats in Kosovo. So it can be done. We’re trying to do the same thing in Afghanistan. It takes work and effort, and we’re doing that. So the combination of force generation and any progress we can make in reducing the most operationally impactive caveats has the effect of building greater cohesion and also adding to the total capability of our forces.
With regard to Pakistan, I want to stress that the relationship is still a developing one. It’s a new one for us. It’s a new one for the Pakistani authorities and the military. But the tone of the meetings is very helpful. The forthright exchange of information is most appreciated. The true nature of where this relationship goes – and I’ll take the optimistic view based on our preliminary discussion – is that it’s promising. The devil will be in the details, two, three or four months from now as we get through the winter and into next spring, to see if this good start can translate to really focus the results along the border, to make sure that we can help to the extent that we can the vision of the border agreements come to reality, so that there’s more control and there’s more knowledge about what’s going on, and there’s less uncontrolled flow of people across the borders. It’s a very difficult challenge in a very difficult region, but we’re off to a good start. I appreciate the effort that General ul Haq made in coming to SHAPE, and I think the Secretary General was very pleased with his initial meeting with him at NATO. So, a positive start; details to follow.
Q: And on Riga … in fact you’re looking more for some kind of rhetorical reaffirmation … rather than immediate results in terms of the caveats….?
GEN JONES: It will be a progressive thing. I don’t think you’ll get a total solution. But I think as nations sit and are able to talk together, hear the presentations, think about the material, that this strong consensus of 26 nations and 11 non-NATO nations will continue to do what they’re doing. And in those areas where we need more application and more focus – and I mentioned some of them to you just a moment ago – hopefully that will create that kind of momentum where we need to have a more effective impact.
Q:
GEN JONES: On the Pakistan question, what I need to stress here is that this is still a developing relationship, both at the political and military level. It’s one that will find its own way. My part of it is the military one, and I’m encouraged by the candour, the openness and the forthrightness of the visits that we’ve had, and the honest and open discussions that we’ve had. And I’m quite sure at the political level that will find its own way in time. It’s an important relationship to have. Obviously what goes on at the border is important. The Talibanisation problem is not just an Afghan problem. It’s a regional problem, and something that both countries have to work on – the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan together. But also when you have 37 nations who are contributing their treasure and their most precious resources, the soldiers that wear the uniforms, there is obviously a very intense interest in making sure that we do the things that we’re supposed to do correctly. So it’s an emerging relationship, an important one, and time will give you more information as this develops.
As far as what goes on on the Pakistani side of the border, and how the government handles its relationships on that side, that’s part of the equation. It’s not one that we can affect directly, but it’s one that we’re obviously interested in because the effects of that relationship are what we feel over in Afghanistan. So it’ll be important to stay abreast of that and to work on it. I’m quite sure the Secretary General and the political arm of NATO will be doing just that. We have a very important tripartite commission which meets regularly. It’s actually more than a tripartite commission, because it includes the OEF as well. But NATO is now the lead element of that commission and of course Afghani representatives, Pakistani representatives, with regular dialogue that can only mean good things. And we are trying to exchange liaison officers to make sure that we have full-time representation in the different headquarters so that communication is instantaneous and there’s no slow down.
With regard to the caveats, let me just say that we have never reached zero in any mission. In other words, you never really completely remove these restrictions. Sovereign nations have the right to send footnotes as to how they think their forces could best be used, and anything that they want to say. We respect that. The ones that we are going after are the ones that are most operationally restrictive. But working with nations on those things, we understand that you are not going to be immediately successful. We have partial success in the case of some countries that lifted the caveats and others that are still working on it. I prefer not to be more specific on this point because this work is still ongoing. We are meeting some success. People are trying to do the right thing. And so I think at the Summit we will have a clearer picture on where we are – not only with regard to national restrictions but also with regard to the force generation development and also the development of the NRF as we head toward Full Operational Capability.
Q: Crucial period coming up…..
GEN JONES: NATO did pass a critical moment with Operation Medusa and I think that we were extremely successful from the military standpoint. The Taliban were knocked off stride…. (inaudible). It’s good to see the level of enemy activity, statistically at any rate, decreasing as we currently stand. And particularly going into the winter I think it was a good tactical success. What has to happen after those, though, is that reconstruction has to be brought immediately to bear. And the people have to see that in the aftermath of violence, when there is violence, a more permanent and secure environment is created as quickly as possible. This is why I argued for more police, better trained police, more focus on corruption, more replacing ineffective governors and police chiefs, and more emphasis on the counter-narcotics programme so that we can start turning these things around and bring security and stability to those areas where there has been none. The south has been a particular problem for a long time because there has never been a large troop presence there. This is still new. This is less than three or four months old. We’ve never had a large troop presence in the south. There’s never been much reconstruction. There’s never been much evidence of the government’s presence. And we are laying down the marker that NATO is not only there but is going to stay there, and we’re intent on bringing to the south the same things that we’ve brought to other areas of the country – notably the north and the west. This is the work at hand. What happens during the winter and after the winter, we’ll have to wait and see. But I do believe that NATO was tested, intentionally, and I think that the opposing forces understand that the likelihood of them defeating NATO militarily is not very high, or defeating anyone militarily is not very high. So they’ll resort back to the traditional tactics that they wage in a war of attrition. And the war of attrition is one where, if we’re properly organised and we bring all elements of our effort together in cohesion, we will win that. But if we don’t, it will be longer and it will be more difficult, and it will be more costly. That’s why I think this is an important period, because it gives us a chance to refocus ourselves and also reorganise to do the things that we absolutely have to do that I’ve mentioned repeatedly over the last few months.
Q (FR):
GEN JONES: I continue to insist that we need the 15 percent that we don’t have in the plan for our operations. We have succeeded in generating about 85 percent of the force, and we are trying to get the 15 percent that we don’t have. It isn’t an enormous amount, but nevertheless it makes a difference and I would be much happier to have the complete force, at 90 or 95 percent instead of 80 or 85 percent.
Q (FR):
GEN JONES: It’s a combination, but capacity – helicopters, transportation, logistic support, reconnaissance forces. We already have a Polish battalion which will arrive next year. It’s about 2,500 men. It isn’t huge.
Q (FR):
GEN JONES: Yes. It’s a percentage of the 15 percent that we are trying to obtain. It’s about 800 men.
Q (FR): So you’ll be at a bit more than 80 percent….
GEN JONES: Yes, with the Polish battalion it’s a bit more.
Q: And you’re optimistic that this meeting that is going on now will provide the remaining forces…..?
GEN JONES: We will see. I can’t predict what the nations will contribute, but I think everyone is working in the interest of reaching the force levels that we need.
Q: NRF ….
GEN JONES: We’re in the hands of nations, obviously. Interestingly enough, we’re meeting with good success in generating forces in the out years. I think NRF-10 is already at 80 percent of its force required. That’s very positive. The one that we’re most interested in is NRF-8 which is the one that comes into existence in January, and nations are meeting as we speak to discuss what force contributions might be offered. We’re not terribly far away, so I’m optimistic that we’re moving in the right direction and I hope that we’ll be able to declare FOC by Riga, which is everybody’s wish. So it’s a question of what happens over the next several days between now and the Summit. But the work is ongoing and we’ll be optimistic and see what happens.
Q: To go back to Afghanistan, when you talk about the caveats which are causing the most problems, can you give us a few examples of what that means and how important that is? And if I may also ask a question about operation Active Endeavour. This has been going on now for about five years. Can you give us some ideas on what impact that has had, and have you found terrorist equipment….?
GEN JONES: I’ll ask Colonel Crotts to get you the statistics of the boardings (provided: 102 compliant boardings and over 83,000 ships hailed) and some of the findings that we’ve had in operation Active Endeavour so you can have that precisely. But examples of the most operationally impactive caveats would be where a nation provides forces and puts a restriction on limiting how those forces can be used: sometimes restricting to a certain geographical area; sometimes saying that we cannot use those forces anywhere else in the country without going for national approval, which means generally a parliamentary decision; forces that are provided but with specific restrictions on what they can do, for example restrictions on crowd and riot control in areas where crowds can gather very quickly. We saw this in Kosovo, that troops have to be able to understand the tactics and techniques for crowd and riot control. Those kinds of restrictions make it difficult in a crisis, to have a commander go through his inventory to see what he can’t do as opposed to what he can do. So the fewer of those types of restrictions the better, that limit the commander or force him to use certain forces when he would like to have an obvious ability to reach down and use the forces that are closest to the scene. Those kinds of things are what we’re after. It’s fairly logical stuff, actually.
Q: How many restrictions are there….?
GEN JONES: Since we’ve been focusing on this intently, we’re in the process right now of asking nations to re-declare all their caveats to make sure that we have it right. But to give you a sense of proportion, we were really targeting about 50 caveats when we started this. We’ve made some progress and we expect to make others. I’ve received letters from Chiefs of Defence declaring that some countries have lifted their caveats, or rewritten them in a way that makes their forces more useful. So we’re making progress. I think we’ll have a better sense of where we are at the end of this force generation conference tomorrow, but we’re definitely making progress on that score. There are some things that we just won’t be able to do, but in the main I think we’ll be better off and more capable. I think that just going through the exercise of asking nations to re-declare their restrictions is going to be good. Some of these forces were provided a year ago, so we’re focusing on them and saying are you sure this is what you mean, and if you mean it, say it again. That’s helpful.
Q: Could you specify which nations have lifted their caveats?
GEN JONES: I’d rather let the process unfold and then answer that question after this process is over.
Q:
GEN JONES: It’s a dynamic situation because of individual expectations under which nations entered the mission to start with. What existed in 2004, 2005 and 2006 is the counter-clockwise rotation of the mission expanded; certain things changed. For instance in the south, the introduction of almost 9,000 troops did cause a predictable reaction, and we said all along that we believed we would be tested. And we were tested. So nations are trying to do the right thing, I believe. Sometimes it’s not just a question of sending troops to combat. It’s sending troops to focus on reconstruction, for example. It could be, for example, in this humanitarian mission in the northwest, that we might want to ask nations to lend us some support from other parts of the country to work on the humanitarian operation. We would like to have the flexibility of doing that rather quickly, because lives are at risk. And we would like to have the commanders empowered to make those kinds of decisions without having to wait three, four or five days for a national parliamentary decision. So it’s not just about fighting. It’s about the totality of the mission and being able to put manpower and capability where it’s most needed, when it’s needed, at the time it’s needed. In the aftermath of Medusa, we would like to be able to borrow forces from different parts of the country to aid in the civil-military reconstruction, without having to go back to capitals to get an affirmative decision just because it happens to be the southern region.
As nations get more comfortable with Afghanistan at large, and understand a little bit more about the complexities and the need for speed in certain times – but not just to fight, to bring about the effects that we’re trying to bring about – that’s really what the principal objective is here. It limits the commander’s ability to do what he needs to do, if he can’t do it when he needs to do it. Whether it’s a humanitarian mission or whether it’s coming to the aid of allies who are in extremis. For example, just for the sake of a hypothetical situation, if we’re able to lift caveats on the quick response forces that we have in all of the sectors around the country, that has the effect of providing COMISAF with as much as an infantry battalion. Because these QRFs are company-sized. There is at least one in each area. Those kinds of effects would be very beneficial in an in extremis condition. When friends and allies are in need of help, we would like to be able to know that we have the capacity to respond quickly, as we did in the south – there were quite a few countries that did respond quickly. We focus on the negative, but let’s also focus on the positive. There were quite a few countries that came to the aid of our Canadian and British colleagues as they were struggling to impose their will in the south, and it turned out to be a success. The NA was a part of that. The United States, I’m happy to say, was a big part of it as well, and other countries that came to assist them. So we’re working on developing that kind of spirit and that kind of cohesion, and we will take every bit of progress we can, whether it’s a humanitarian mission, whether it’s aid or reconstruction, or in extremis where they’re coming to the aid of a fellow ally. We think that is the right way to go and that’s what nations should do. How we get there will take time, but I think we’re moving in the right direction.
Q: To what extent will energy security be a priority in Riga …..?
GEN JONES: I think the answer to that is it’s still work in progress. I know the Secretary General and many nations are keenly interested in energy security being one of the platforms of Riga. Whether that comes about or not is really a political question, and we’ll just have to wait and see. But there’s a lot of interest in energy security. I personally believe it’s something that the Alliance needs to consider seriously, so I’m hoping personally that it would be one of the things that is discussed and is an outcome of the Riga Summit. But I’m not sure that we’re completely there yet politically.
Q:
GEN JONES: The more accurate way to say it, I think, is that around 2001 when I was Commandant of the Marine Corps, the outgoing Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Dick Myers, was going to be retiring and the Secretary of Defense was looking around at different candidates. At that time I had another almost two years to go on my term as Commandant. I loved my job very much. To be Commandant of the Marine Corps is the highest thing that I had ever even hoped to achieve in my life. I was very committed to what I was doing. I wanted to finish my term, which would have finished in June of 2003. So because there were many other good candidates to be Chairman, I had a very nice discussion with the Secretary and I asked if he would be good enough to leave me in my position – assuming he was happy with the job I was doing – and it was my intent to retire in 2003. And now it’s my intent to retire in 2007. But that’s the long and short of it. It wasn’t nearly as sensational as some people try to make it.
Q: How far is the so-called Dutch approach affecting the cohesion of the troops in Afghanistan?
GEN JONES: What’s the Dutch approach?
Q: Focusing on cooperation with the local people, not focusing on fighting and arresting the Taliban and so on.
GEN JONES: I think that all forces have to respect the structure of Afghan society. Our goal is to stabilise regions and to bring about stability, security and reconstruction. We believe that if we can do that, however we do it, a free, more independent and hopefully prosperous Afghanistan will emerge. So it’s not just a question of using kinetic means to bring about the desired end state. NATO will fight when it has to. We’ve proven that. We would much prefer to bring about the totality of the change that we seek to bring to Afghanistan, to make the Afghans responsible at least in part for their own future, and to show by example and by persuasion that there is a better way and it doesn’t have to be violence in that society. But make no mistake about it. If in fact we are pushed and challenged, I think we’ve proven that we can do the job. But I think we also respect what individual commanders can do in their own sectors to bring about the conditions that allow for the security, stability and reconstruction to occur.
Q: What do you plan to do when you retire?
GEN JONES: I really don’t have a plan, to be honest with you. Jokingly I say I have a short-term plan and a long-term plan. The short-term plan is to be home for Christmas, and the long-term plan is to be in the Caribbean by New Year’s.
Q: Do you have any recommendations for your successor?
GEN JONES: A lot of recommendations! But I’m sure General Craddock is going to bring renewed energy and will do some great things. I envy the opportunity that he’ll have to come in at a very important time in the Alliance. I certainly wish him well, and I wish all of you well. Thank you for your friendship, thank you for support, and thank you for the important work you do.>
Back to top ^
